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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
dividend, there will be no interference by the courts with their de-
cision, unless they are guilty of a wilful abuse of their discretionary
powers, or of bad faith or of a neglect of duty.2 And so deferring
declaration of dividends in an effort to improve the condition of the
company is permissible.3 Of course where the accumulation of
surplus is greatly in excess of capital and the directors' only motive
in increasing the surplus is for the purpose of expansion with no
thought of the rights of stockholders it may be deemed an abuse of
discretion not to declare a dividend.4 It is said that among the re-
serves which it may be prudent to establish before a surplus avail-
able for dividends is found are reserves for depreciation, repairs,
bad accounts, unknown taxes and fluctuations in business conditions. 5
The facts in the instant case do not warrant the interference of the
Court, if the rules laid down in the cases considered are to be fol-
lowed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the powers of the direc-
tors have been illegally or unconscientiously executed or that their
acts were fraudulent and destructive of the rights of stockholders.
H. L. B.
EQUITY--CANcELLATIoN-CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.-The de-
fendant defaulted in its contract to install fixtures in plaintiff's store
after it had partially performed. Plaintiff had given a series of
twenty-eight notes to defendant's attorney to be held in escrow until
completion of the contract, and in addition had given defendant a
conditional sales contract and a chattel mortgage. After repeated
efforts to get defendant to complete its contract plaintiff was finally
compelled to 'have the balance of the work performed by a third
party. The defendant somehow secured the notes from his attorney
and subsequently negotiated one of the notes. Plaintiff brought suit
in equity seeking cancellation of the notes, the chattel mortgage, and
the conditional sales contract. Defendant counterclaims for the bal-
'New York etc. R. R. v. Nickols, 119 U. S. 296, 7 Sup. Ct. 209 (1886) ;
Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 N. Y. 162 (1883); Burden v. Burden,
159 N. Y. 287, 54 N. E. 17 (1899), wherein the Court held that so long as
the directors are acting honestly, and within their discretionary powers in
accumulating a surplus in an iron manufacturing corporation, a stockholder
must abide by their decision and it is only when one can show that the di-
rectors are guilty of fraud and bad faith in accumulating a large surplus to
the injury of the stockholders that a court of equity would interfere.
' Williams v. Western Union Tel. Co., ibid.
'Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 1; Reynolds v. Diamond Mills
Paper Co.. 69 N. J. Eq. 299, 60 Att. 941 (1905), wherein it appeared that
the surplus was employed exclusively in expansion of business and in increas-
ing salaries. The Court there held that the directors must bear in mind
the stockholders of the corporation and not accumulate a huge surplus which
might in the end go to future creditors of the corporation.
rBallantine, Private Corporations (1927) p. 507.
RECENT DECISIONS
ance between the moneys expended by the plaintiff to complete the
contract and the contract price, a matter of some $600. Held, that
the plaintiff is entitled to cancellation of the notes, chattel mortgage,
and conditional sales contract, and that the defendant is entitled to
judgment in the sum of $569, the balance between the contract price
and cost of completion, less an agreed amount of $200, stipulated
damages for delay by defendant in performance. Rollin v. Grand
Store Fixture Company, 231 A. D. 27, 246 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1st
Dept., 1930).
Theoretically maxims of equity are guiding principles of justice.
The difficulty lies in determining just which maxim to apply in a
given instance. The Court in the instant case applies the maxim that
"he who seeks equity must do equity." It is conceded that in a court
of law the defendant would have no right of recovery for part per-
formance.' The question arises then whether the plaintiff by com-
ing into a court of equity has waived his techruical legal defenses so
that equity once having assumed jurisdiction of the action will dis-
pose of the entire matter or whether this is an instance in which
"equity follows the law." A related question arises as to whether
"equity will permit one to profit by his own wrongdoing." No per-
son shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advan-
tage of his own wrong, or to take profit by his own inequity.2 Clearly,
in the instant case, defendant was a wrong-doer first, when he
breached his contract; secondly, when he negotiated the notes. Was
the plaintiff to be compelled to defend twenty-eight actions on the
notes, assuming each note was negotiated and became due? Was his
remedy to pay out the sum demanded on each note, to holders in due
course, and then sue the defendant for the sums paid out? This
would involve a circuitous and expensive procedure, thrust on the
plaintiff through no fault of his. And yet because he adopts the
more reasonable method of protecting himself by securing an in-
junction restraining the defendant from placing the notes in circu-
lation and for their cancellation, he is deemed to have assented to
reimburse defendant wrongdoer. "Equity regards substance rather
than form." 3 "The first principle of equity is justice." 4 The deci-
sion of the Court in the instant case appears to be a mechanical adop-
tion of old principles in circumstances calling for their judicial
destruction in the administration of justice.
S. E. C.
1 Frankel v. Friedman, 199 N. Y. 351, 92 N. E. 666 (1910).
Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1918).
'Zeiser v. Cohen, 207 N. Y. 407, 101 N. E. 184 (1913); Silverstein v.
Touhenkimmel, 209 App. Div. 710, 205 N. Y. Supp. 241 (3rd Dept., 1924).
' Tompers v. Bank of America, 217 App. Div. 691, 217 N. Y. Supp. 67
(1st Dept., 1926).
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H4USIBAND AND WIFE-FOREIGN DIVORCE-SEPARATION-AF-
FIRMATIVE RELIEF.-Plaintiff and one Dalinsky, domiciled and resi-
dent in New York, intermarried. Plaintiff left New York tempo-
rarily for the sole purpose of securing a Nevada divorce. Although
on her suit in the district court at Reno, Dalinsky was personally
served in New York, he did not appear nor submit himself to that
jurisdiction. Plaintiff returned and remarried defendant in this
action in New Jersey. Defendant was and is resident and domi-
ciled in New York. In an action for separation and alimony on the
grounds of desertion, Held, the decree of divorce from Dalinsky
being invalid here, the second marriage was never recognized as
valid by the laws of this State. Fisher v. Fisher, 254 N. Y. 463,
173 N. E. 680 (1930).
It is well settled that a decree of divorce rendered in a foreign
state will be recognized in New York, where the court rendering the
decree had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and parties, even
though the divorce was granted for a cause which is not recognized
in this state.' If the defendant, in a foreign action, was domiciled
in New York and served personally while here and he does not
appear, then, although the divorce may have full force and effect in
the state wherein it was decreed, it will not be recognized in New
York.2 Where a party seeks to avoid a divorce on the ground of
want of jurisdiction, he must show that he was domiciled in New
York and did not make an appearance at the action. 3 Where neither
party to the foreign action is domiciled in New York at the time of
the rendition of the decree, and the notice of the action is served by
publication, this state will recognize the foreign divorce if the state
wherein the defendant is domiciled recognizes it, but if the latter
state does not recognize the decree, New York will not.4  The
instant case is in harmony with previous expressions of the Court of
Appeals and is sound practically.
H. L. B.
INSURANcE-ExCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF FRAUD REVERSIBLE
ERRo.-Plaintiff purchased a farm for $11,500 and built a barn cost-
ing $10,000 thereon. Defendant insurance company's experts esti-
mated the property's market value at $8,000. The buildings were
insured for only $1,600. The farm did not yield a profit. No stock
' Stewart v. Stewart, 205 App. Div. 587, 200 N. Y. Supp. 168 (2nd Dept.,
1922); Straus v. Straus, 122 App. Div. 729, 107 N. Y. Supp. 842 (1st Dept.,
1907); Richards v. Richards, 87 Misc. 134, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1028 (1914).
'Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 (1878) ; People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78 (1879);
Olmstead v. Olmstead, 190 N. Y. 458, 83 N. E. 569 (1908); Ackerman v.
Ackerman, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192 (1911).
'Percival v. Percival, 186 N. Y. 587, 79 N. E. 1114 (1905), aff'g 106 App.
Div. 111, 94 N. Y. Supp. 909 (2nd Dept., 1905).
'Ball v. Cross, 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106 (1921).
